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This article highlights some findings of a village-
based primary study done in 1986/87 in western
Chittoor District, in the region of Rayalaseema,
Andhra Pradesh. It investigates the ways in which
power is exercised in a system of economic exchange
in which there is a close connection between credit
markets and crop markets. In particular, I was
concerned to examine whether moneylenders could
'force' producers to sell their crops to them, and if so,
how and to what extent. I expected some groups in
the remote, semi-arid upland Deccan plateau to
exhibit this type of exchange relationship.
I begin by describing the structure of economic
exchange in the region, showing similarities and
dissimilarities among the hamlets studied with a
particular emphasis on traditional notions of com-
petition. The study focused on exchange relations in
two villages, Tavalam (TVM) and Nirnmanapalle
(NPL). We (two local assistants and I) measured the
production, consumption, stocks, sales and other
transactions of various crops, as well as details of
loans and repayments, labour hiring, and other eco-
nomic decisions of the households surveyed. The
sample surveyed was based on a wider enumeration
of over 1,000 households which we did in 1986, and
86 households were interviewed monthly for 11
months (May 1986 to April 1987). Second, I shall
focus on the phenomenon of clientelization, which
helps to explain the micro-diversity found in the
villages. Third, I shall examine the sources of power
which determined the success of two informal mecha-
nisms of control within markets - clientelization and
more subtle methods of manipulating producers. I
shall conclude the chapter by drawing out some
conclusions for further research.
2 LOCAL OUTPUT AND CREDIT MARKETS
Local farmers produced two main crops, paddy
I This paper was originally prepared for the 'Semioaire sur les
Exchanges Commerciaux' held at Méze, France, August1992, under
the auspices of the Institut de Recherches Agronomiques Tropicales
et des Cultures Vivrières (CIRAD). I would like to acknowledge the
advice of Judith Heyer and Barbara Harriss on the topics covered in
this paper, as well as the invaluable research collaboration of Lucia da
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(rice) and groundnut. They grew groundnut on all
their unirrigated land, interspersed with beans and
sorghum plants; and paddy on almost all the irri-
gated land. A few mango gardens, tomato crops,
and ragi or finger millet made up the remainder of
their production. They were involved in the ground-
nut marketing chain that led all the way to Bombay
and other major cities. There were no subsistence
producers, though many people ate home-grown
paddy as one component of their diet. The surplus
paddy produced in these villages was sold into
hearby towns, whence it would be circulated within
the state of Andhra Pradesh.
Producers were highly involved in marketing their
output, especially in the case of groundnut. Regard-
ing paddy sales, however, during the survey year of
1986/87 only a few households were surplus pro-
ducers of paddy, but these were responsible for a
huge outflow of this crop from the area. Meanwhile,
merchants and official channels were bringing rice
from nearby towns for sale in the villages where
every single family bought rice in most months of
the year. One reason for this two-way circulation of
paddy and rice is the demand for higher quality rice.
Most small producers of paddy, making up a huge
proportion of petty commodity producers, did not
sell their own paddy. They ate it themselves after
storage periods ranging from a week to several
months. However, they also bought rice, sometimes
of a higher quality than that which they produced.
Turning to groundnut sales, however, we find a
much wider involvement of households in the mar-
ket. The petty producers sold their groundnut soon
after harvest, as well as providing some of it to their
landlords (of both capitalist and merchant classes) as
rents. The small number of households falling into
the capitalist 'landlord' (5 per cent) and merchant (9
per cent) classes had much larger surpluses to sell,
Corta and the discussionby the participants at the seminar. Of course
I take responsibility for all the flaws which remain. A final version of
this paper will appear in a book based on the Méze Seminar edited
by Henry Bernstein, Maureen Mackintosh, Alain LePlaideur and
Frédéric Lançon to whom the author and the editor of this Bulletin are
grateful for permission to publish this article.
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and were involved in storing the groundnut for sale
well after harvest at higher prices.
The class of merchants was defined broadly as
households involved in buying and selling crops
and/or keeping a retail shop for sale of foods and
goods. They ranged from a few wholesale mer-
chants without a shop front, who dealt in paddy,
groundnut, cement, and fertiliser, to the many highly
visible retail merchants with shops, most of whom
also dealt in paddy and groundnut. A few itinerant
dealers in sweets and flowers (all in NPL) were also
included in this class, giving a total of 42 households
in NFL and 7 in TVM. These proportions - 12 per
cent and 4 per tent of the population, respectively -
directly affected the degree of competitiveness in the
two villages over a range of items including retail
foods, purchase of produce, and various types of
loans. In addition the area surrounding NPL and
TVM, which included many off-road hamlets and
few shops, had only I per cent resident merchants,
so that people there had to walk into TVM or NPL for
most of their exchanges. In NFL competition was
common, with active verbal rivalry among the shops
along the main street. In TVM, by contrast, mer-
chants kept apart and a few very powerful merchant
households dominated respective hamlets of that
village.
Competition among merchants as creditors was a
crucial aspect of their behaviour. Informal lending,
by family and friends, by merchants, and by em-
ployers, was an important part of the money market
making up 85 per cent of cash loans and 50 per cent
of principal outstanding during the study year. (For
more detail, see Olsen 1991). The local bank charged
interest of 10.5 per cent to 14.5 per cent per year,
while merchants usually charged either 2 per cent
per month, or no interest qn loans. The merchants'
loans were in some cases linkedto other transactions
with borrowers, though not very explicitly. These
cases are explained further below. This kind of
interlinked transaction is an issue that has been
raised in several contexts before (see for instance P.
Bardhan 1980; Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; and Bell
and Srinivasan 1989).
In summary, and working also from secondary
analyses of rural markets in Andhra Pradesh, one
could argue that prices, which varied according to
time, location, and quality of crop, nevertheless
varied around overall levels which were fairly con-
sistent within the five square miles covered by the
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survey area. Competition to lend money was in-
tense, and was related to attempts to get retail cus-
tomers and wholesale sellers. Yet this competition
operated in the context of a network of personal
relationships that shaped market outcomes. The
next section will investigate these by looking at the
relations between certain buyers and sellers.
3 CLIENTELIZATION
K. Bardhan has suggested that clientelization of one
family by another may persist, with changes of
nuance and detail, from pre-capitalist society into
the capitalist period. She thus distinguishes
clientelization from the stronger, more obligatory
patronage of the past (e.g. jajmani, or patron-client
relationships within a 'moral economy'). The con-
cept fits two broad types of inter-household social
relation found in NFL and TVM: first, landlords
having long-term relationships with particular
worker families; and secondly, merchants having
strong ties to producers who borrow from them.
Bardhan actually wrote about clientelization in rela-
tion to the labour relationship, but I believe the idea
fits exchange-related clientelization as well.
My knowledge of the first type of tie is limited by the
scope and orientation of my actual field work. I
focused on exchange, including credit and labour,
but skimmed over the complex areas of rents and the
provision of inputs to each plot of land. Even from
my distanced view, however, I was struck by some
of the ongoing landlord-worker relationships found
in both villages.
A 'landlord', or bhuuswami in Telugu, is a family that
owns enough land and other assets to be able to
avoid the drudgery of field labour. These people
manage or oversee field work, and they hire in
workers for much of the work, along with offering
some lands out for rent. Only 10-15 per cent of the
land was rented during the study year. The word
bhuusw2mi refers both to the male head of the land-
lord household, and to the household as a whole.
Women in these households did a variety of activi-
ties, often including the supervision of both male
and female wage labourers. The term 'landlord',
though being a direct translation of the term
bhuuswami, suffers from suggesting too much power
and wealth: these families had only 10 to 40 acres
and in some studies would be called rich peasants or
small capitalist farmers, depending on the analyst's
perspective. By Indian standards they are small
landlords, and they were actively involved in capi-
talist investment behaviour.
The workers who served the landlords worked for
them in the fields, in the home processing food and
cleaning, and by providing other services. Some
workers rented land from the same family which
hired them for labour. A landlord might have first
call on the tenant family's labour in peak periods of
activity such as sowing and harvesting, and the
obligation to work for the landlord extended to both
men and women (see Da Corta and Olsen 1990 for
more details about relations between workers and
landlords). However I was hampered in studying
the interaction between land rental and labour, be-
cause I tried to record information in ways that
retained the anonymity of respondents. This tech-
nique was aimed at reassuring participants of the
confidentiality of what they told me. In several
ways, research techniques such as this one inhibited
my ability to understand the nature of linkages,
threats, obligations, and other interpersonal aspects
of market interaction.
In any case, the landlord-worker relationship did
not affect market sales of crops as much as the
second set of relationships involving clienteliation:
those between particular merchants and particular
petty commodity producing farmers. This relation-
ship influenced the timing of farmers' sales, and
hence was a factor leading to their getting a worse
price than that which the stockists of crops could get.
There was a strong tendency for merchants to lend
more money to these farmers than to workers. One
might expect them to lend to farmers 'for produc-
tion' and to workers 'for consumption', butin fact no
such distinction can be made. Many farmers re-
ported 'provisions' as the reason for borrowing,
while many workers worked a little land and so
could be borrowing for productive purposes. Debt
taken during 1986/87 averaged Rs. 5,500 among
petty commodity producing farmers, versus Rs.
2,800 for those workers who owned a little land and
less than Rs. 1,000 for landless workers.
The petty commodity producing farmers of TVM
were more dependent on private moneylenders (63
per cent of their debt) than were those in NPL (14 per
cent of their debt) (these data from Olsen 1991: 261).
Discussions about these debts showed that there was
a clear, acknowledged clientele relationship between
some petty commodity producing farmer-borrow-
ers by two merchants in TVM. These borrowers
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laughed when we asked who they planned to sell
their groundnut to: to their lender, of course! We
asked all producers about their past, present, and
planned groundnut sales, and found a much higher
prevalence of 'tying' sales to loans in TVM than in
NPL. These tied sales did not involve advance price
fixing, but always involved selling the crop when
asked to, immediately after the harvest. In each
'tied' case, a third element was that the producing
family regularly bought supplies from the same
merchant. The Telugu word sarukulu, translated as
'provisions', referred to consumer goods such as
rice, dal, oil, matches, soap, and kerosene. In several
cases the family would buy these provisions without
paying, and the debt would be added to the out-
standing debt total to be repaid at harvest time.
An intriguing contrast between these 'tied' borrow-
ers and some instances of usury reported from In-
dian research is that the interest rate was sometimes
zero, and the interest rate norm of 2 per cent per
month was rarely exceeded. Thus a discussion of
usury would not fit this case very well (for example,
Bhaduri 1977, or Basu 1984). It was impossible to
calculate implicit interest rates, the way Sarap (1988)
did to show higher charges to tied borrowers, be-
cause of the scarcity of comparable 'un-tied' local
transactions.
The rationale for clientelization of this kind lay in the
long-run economic strategies of the two sides. First,
the merchants were keen to ensure themselves reli-
able supplies of groundnut from local producers
every year at harvest time. They knew (as I also
discovered from analysis of secondary price data)
that in urban markets groundnut prices would rise
steadily from the harvest month to the sowing time
6-8 months later. Price increases averaged 4 per cent
per month over many years (without making any
adjustment for inflation) in reporting markets of
Andhra Pradesh. The prices then fell suddenly
during the growing season, during which time there
were few transactions. These price movements can-
not be 'observed' in the villages because most pro-
ducers sell their entire crop within a month of har-
vest. Producers were aware of the movements, but
were unable to take advantage of them. By contrast,
local merchants would control large stocks of ground-
nut, which comprised their own produce resulting
from the use of wage labour; their tenants' produce,
usually shared on a 50-50 basis; and purchased
produce. My study did not follow the marketing
chain further to urban markets, and therefore cannot
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estimate costs or profit margins for either rural or
urban wholesalers, but the indirect evidence sug-
gests large profits were to be made there.
Secondly, the producers themselves had strong rea-
sons to remain 'tied' to one lender/buyer/retailer.
They felt safe in the knowledge that their merchant
would lend to them in emergencies, and would be
lenient during drought periods. One very poor
farmer in TVM described one merchant as his dikku,
which means a protector, refuge, or even god! He
explained that the lender could be approached 'even
in the middle of the night' for loans, and that offend-
ing him was not worth it if it put the loan source at
risk. For such people, access to bank loans did not
address their need for credit to smooth out con-
sumption and to deal with sickness and other emer-
gencies. This was a primary reason given for staying
'tied' to one merchant.
A few households had rejected this kind of relation-
ship. They complained of the restrictions put on
them by the merchant. In one case the lender had
charged them an interest rate of 5 per cent per month
in the past. The family got fed up and refused
thereafter to deal with that merchant. The merchant
in question, when interviewed in 1988, explained
that he expected his borrowers to sell their crop to
him; if they sold to anyone else, he would stop
lending to them and not deal with them in future
(private communication by Lucia Da Corta and D.
Venkateshwarlu).
The essence of these exchange-related ties in TVM
was that there were few alternatives if one offended
the lender or refused to follow their directives. The
alternative source of supplies was NPL, 3 kms away;
the alternative source of loans was other local mer-
chants making similar demands, or else merchants
much further away. Selling groundnut to an outside
merchant was a bit easier, because they visited TVM
by bus or by cycle from NPL at harvest time. But
one's position as a client, or as a 'free' agent, would
be well known to all the producers of TVM, and
probably to all the merchants who came there. No
break between families is secret in these villages.
Therefore, one's bargaining position vis-à-vis visit-
ing moneylenders would be weakened by their
knowledge that you might actually be desperate to
sell your crop or to get a loan that very day. In
addition, it would be hard to sell a crop after harvest
time, (for example, three months later) because mer-
chants were not as interested then and did not visit
places like TVM. Their stocks had already been laid
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
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away, waiting for a price rise; they did not want to
pick up more stocks at the higher mid-season price.
In NFL, personalized obligations to sell to one mer-
chant lender were not reported. Patterns of selling
crops repeatedly to one merchant were recorded,
though rarely, but often that producer would bor-
row from a different source (or several sources) and
would not feel obligated to buy goods from just one
merchant. There were clear attempts at
clientelization, where the retail merchant would
offer free loans to petty commodity producing farm-
ers and hope to retain their custom for future trans-
actions, and as a result many more loans were made
interest-free in NFL than in TVM.
To summarize, many borrowers were clients of the
lenders in TVM, having longstanding social rela-
tionships involving mutual obligations and a threat
of withdrawn services if the borrower pulled out. In
NFL, by contrast, ties in the sphere of exchange
relations were much looser and more fluid. Compe-
tition among lenders, retailers and groundnut buy-
ers was active and effective, not just a potential,
seasonal, or ineffective threat from outsiders.
Bharadwaj's perceptive analysis of Farm Manage-
ment Survey data described the kind of situation I
have outlined above:
The character of markets reflects and to a signifi-
cant extent is determined by the local patterns of
power. At the same time, the functioning of the
markets is itself such as to reinforce the pattern of
power.
(Bharadwaj 1974: 3)
In the next section I will relate some theoretical
models such as Bharadwaj's, Bhaduri's, and Basu's
to the particular complexities of the area studied and
draw out certain implications for impact of power
relations on the nature of exchange in TVM and
NFL.
4 POWER IN LOCAL MARKETS
Bharadwaj (1974, 1985) and Bhaduri (1973, 1983)
have both argued that 'forced commerce' will occur
when poor peasants have to sell to their money-
lender and/or have to hand over crops to their
landlord. In their schema, the landlords were simul-
taneously the village moneylenders, and had power
stemming from this dual position as well as from
their assets and status within the village system.
Bharadwaj distinguished two types of small pro-
ducer: the poorest ones who are compulsorily in-
volved in markets, and who she found tended 'to
devote a higher proportion of their area to cash
crops' (1974, p85), and the less poor ones who could
produce more for their own subsistence.
Clearly these theories of political economy overlap
with economic ideas such as monopoly and
interlinkage. But as Bharadwaj stressed, the compe-
tition/monopoly continuum is only one, very par-
tial, dimension of local power in markets. Even after
modifying this approach to allow for interlinkage of
markets and interlocking of transactions, there is still
a diversity and complexity in local market exchanges
that requires explanation. An improved explanation
requires (i) distinguishing types of power, which in
the present context include 'clientelization' and 'subtle
manipulation'; and (ii) fully assessing the historical,
social, and personal sources of power in the real
markets studied. These points are discussed below,
with a view to improving the research agenda of
studies of markets.
Socio-economic power can be classified into at least
five types: force, coercion, manipulation, authority
and leadership. (Lukes 1974; Fay 1987: 120-121).
This typology involves an assessment of how far the
weak are aware of the power held over them, and
how far they participate in perpetuating that power
by accepting or agreeing with the ideologies of the
powerful.
The power of moneylenders in TVM was, I believe,
based primarily on coercion. They could threaten to
withdraw services from a borrower if they defaulted,
or borrowed from someone else, or sold their crop to
someone else. Basu (1986) has theorized this type of
power by setting up hypothetical situations where a
lender is in a position effectively to refuse to deal
with a third party such as family and friends of the
borrower if he or she does not obey. The source of
this kind of power, in Basu's model, is the isolation
of rural people from effective alternatives. His
model is therefore closely related to the monopolis-
tic landlord/lender and absence of markets found in
Bhaduri (1977). However, unlike iñ Bhaduri's sce-
nario, TVM and NPL had well-developed markets
with several competitors in moneylending and crop
sales. Nevertheless there was clientelization in one
of the villages. The persistence of implicit coercion
into the 1980s is partly due to the historical develop-
ment of trust, awe, and other feelings of respect
toward the merchant moneylenders. In other words,
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merchants' power resulted partly from shared ideas
about the merchant's right to be selective in lending,
not only from material conditions such as the ab-
sence of competitors.
These points highlight two areas for further re-
search. First, one could explore the nature of threats
made by lenders and other powerful people in the
village. The threat of withdrawing services from a
borrower was frightening even if not actually car-
ried out. There was speculation about whether a
lender's sons would beat you for defaulting; yet no
beatings occurred, even during a huge drought, and
many people felt the lender provided a social service
that no stranger or bank would replicate. Second,
the formation of ideas about status, including ideas
about appropriate behaviour of borrowers and re-
spectful attitudes towards merchants, could be ex-
plored with a view to seeing how far merchants had
authority or played a leadership role.
Apart from clientelization where personal power
can be identified and may involve coercion and/or
authority, there is a second source of power for
moneylenders of both TVM and NFL. This is the
subtle manipulation of small producers that 'forces'
them to sell their crop at harvest time whether they
are clients or not. Each crop buyer does not have
personally to force them to sell; instead, the produc-
ers' circumstances, rooted in the social structure,
property rights, traditions of production and pay-
ment, and finally the cycle of debt which is concen-
trated in the crop-growing season, combine to cause
many smaller producers to sell their groundnut at
harvest time even though they know prices will be
higher later on.
The phrase 'subtle manipulation' has been used by
Fay to describe how people's behaviour is circum-
scribed and partially determined by their sciai
location as well as material circumstances. Follow-
ing Lukes (1974), Fay writes that:
the manipulation of people's minds, at least
in any society which has actually existed, employs
the shared self-understandings of those being ma-
nipulated. . . This kind of manipulation is the most
insidious of all because it works directly on the self-
understandings of the manipulated without them
(and perhaps even their oppressors) knowing how
this is accomplished or even that it is the case.
(Fay 1987: 124)
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So when a producer feels 'forced' to sell, or doesn't
feel it that way but effectively is 'forced' to sell, a
subtle manipulation of their decision has occurred.
They may not be aware of this; the 'force' may not be
attributable to any individual. This distinction be-
tween being forced by someone versus being forced
by circumstances explains some of the ambiguity of
the term 'forced commerce' as used by Bhaduri
(1986). He intended both types of force to be in-
cluded in analyses of power in markets.
To use a different phraseology, we could say that the
choice set of the petty commodity producing farm-
ers is limited by their poverty and the lack of regular
income that might offset the effects of highly sea-
sonal agricultural production. Restrictions on choice
do not just happen randomly, though; they are
heavily determined by the social structure. The
situation is historically specific, will have variations
according to personalities and family histories, and
may also involve personal power relationships such
as clientelization. In the particular cases examined
here, small farmers in NPL and TVM had similar
landholdings, had little irrigation, had no offsetting
income besides their crops, and showed very simi-
lar, strong, seasonal patterns in their taking and
repayment of debts. As a result, the timing of their
sales of groundnut meant that they received lower
prices than did the seasonal stockists of groundnut -
mainly local and urban merchants. The farmers
would have got higher prices in urban markets six
months later. The merchants (and to a lesser extent
local landlords) who stored the crop got the benefit
of seasonal price movements, and thereby indirectly
exploited the producers by realizing profits on sub-
stantial stocks without participating in the labour of
groundnut production. Calculations could be made
of the profits to be gained, coming to figures such as
Rs. 2,000 per groundnut stockist, as compared with
wage rates of Rs. 3 to 6 per day and groundnut post-
harvest prices of around Rs. 200 per bag. In good
years, far greater seasonal profits could be expected
for those who would store groundnut. Such esti-
mates are approximate and it is particularly hard to
get reliable figures for sales, stocks, and prices from
large surplus-holders, yet their magnitude suggests
that seasonal price changes and the timing of sale
merged to create unequal returns to household la-
bour for different sellers of groundnut.
It should be reiterated that this finding was grounded
in a situation where the degree of commercialization
of people among all social classes was in general
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
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high. Workers worked mainly for cash wages, with
some kind- and food-payments but very few at-
tached or bonded labourers. Producers were in most
cases arguably capitalist, falling into the two camps
of petty commodity producers and capitalists, not
peasants. Landlords behaved as capitalists although
they liked to keep a veneer of patronage toward
labour; and merchants supported entrepreneurial
behaviour both amongst their own class and among
their client-borrowers.
Within this overall picture however there was con-
siderable inter-village variation. Exchange relations
(by which I mean the nexus of related credit-output-
input-food transactions occurring in the sphere of
circulation, as opposed to the sphere of production)
were qualitatively different betwçen NPL and TVM.
Such differences over small distances may reflect the
unevenness and diversity of a rapidly changing
society, but whether they are temporary differences
or self-reinforcing is an area of current debate (Hazell
and Ramaswamy, et al. 1991).
5 CONCLUSION
The complexity of the findings of the case study does
not defy analysis. This article has shown that several
approaches help to clarify the crop sales decisions of
farmers growing a cash crop alongside a subsistence
crop. One can begin with household strategies for
maximizing income and consumption levels, taking
each social class as behaving differently. Then one
can examine the structure and performance of par-
ticular markets, keeping in mind the likely
interlinkage of each product market with the credit
market and perhaps also with labour and land mar-
kets.
In highly unequal capitalist societies, however, it
will also be necessary to analyse power within mar-
kets. Two types of power have been examined here:
clientelization of some borrowers by powerful mer-
chants, and the more subtle manipulation of a larger
group of producers who find they have little choice
but to sell their crops when prices are at their lowest.
These ideas are merely the application of ideas from
Bharadwaj, Bhaduri, Lukes, Fay, and others to a
particular situation. They lead to the conclusion that
field studies of market power will benefit from
understanding the ideas people have (about mer-
chants; about how borrowers should behave; about
prices; etc.) as well as the material and socio-eco-
nomic conditions in which actual sales take place.
Finally these themes may lead one to expect to find
diversity of institutional forms, contractual types,
etc. even over very small distances because there are
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